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In January of 1978, 1 traveled to Norway and Oreat Britain 
to view oil development in the North Sea. f was particularly 
interested In the socio-economic impact Of oil and energy 
development on the people of both countriea, and in Norway's 
and areat Britalnts efforts to addreas the environmentnl 
connequenoea of oil production, such as oil spill prevention 
and regulation of pollutant discharges. 
Two professors from the University of Alaska who traveled 
with me in Norway have written ?. report concerning a number . 
of the iasues surrounding energy development In Norway. Their 
rf!poz-t is or significant interest and merit. I think it is 
important to make this report available to my colleagues in 
the form of  a report from the Committee on Environment and 
Public Works. It is my belief that we all stand to learn from , 
the effort8 Norway has taken to resolve the signifloant and 
perplexing problems energy development continues to create for 
resource-rich areab of the worSd. 
I apgreaiatd your oontinued interest In disseminating 
this type of information for the benefit of the Congress and 
all Americans. 
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SUM t v lARY 
In January 1978, Senator Mlke Gravel travelled 1n '~orway to abtaln 
lnformatlon on Norweglan raactlons to petroleum development on the continental 
shall  of the North bnd Naiweglan Saas. Thls report presents some lmpllcatlons 
of Norweglan cxparlences whlch may be ralevant to Alaska a s  developed by two 
Unlvcrsity of Alaska profossore who accompanled Senator Gravel and hls assistant  
C.  Demlng Cowlcs. Norway hha auccesslully Intograted petroleum development 
with I ts  oxletlng soclal, polltlcal and aconomlc pollclos. Alaska can and should 
do tho same. ~ o r w a ~ ' s  exporlonccb hove shown that Alaska needs to pay close 
attentlon to petrolcum Impacts on flshlng, sea hcd foullng, and to strengthen the 
c ~ p a b l l l t l e s  o f  small communltlaa t~ ;aspond to petrolcum developments. The 
Norwegian use of chartored flshlng vasscls for continental shelf surveillance 
may be worth Irnltstlng In Alaska. Norwny's approach to envlronmental  control^ 
, 
over Its malor new Bambln Itquid natural gaa pctrochcmlcal complex may be useful 
1 n ' ~ l a s k a .  The ma]oLcutrent contcr of 011 Impact In Norway Is Stavanger, which 
seems to havo handled tho changes bottcr than Alaska. The ~ o r w e g l h  response 
to the Br?vo B1ow4ut was to roqulre a l l  011 companies cooperatively to develop 
a singlo, erncrgoncy organlzotlon cnjmblo of qulck rcsponso In rr pollut~on 
emcrgoncy. Thls approaclr may hovo mrrlt I n  Alaska. North Norway may in the 
near future be impactcd by contlncnlol shalf pctrolcum debolopmcnt In an envlronmant 
simllor to that of coastal Alaska. Thc NorwcgiaA oxperlonce here should be closely 
followod Iqr lcssons appllcablo to Alaska. 
Report No. 90 to Thc st or tin^ 
Ths devcloprnont and lnndlna ot pclmlcum ironl Thc Statfjord Flaltl 
ond a gas trunk-llnc 
Fig. 1. Crmgraphicat location of the Frigg, Ifdmdal ar~d Statfjord /iolds. 
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Introduction 
U . 8 .  Senator Mlke Gravel and his  assistant, Mr. C.  Demlng Cowlee 
travelled to Norway from January B - 12, 1978, to review ~orwegian '  experiences 
, in the petroleum development which Is occurring a t  a rapld pace In the North Sea. 
They were accompanied by Professors Donald F. Lynch and Nils I. Johanslen of 
the University of Alaska, Fairbanks. The purpose of the trip was to collect 
informatlon on Norwegian expedences wlth continental shelf petroleum development 
whlch may be applicable to Alaska. An axtenslve amount of recently published 
. information was obtained and used a s  the prlmary source material for this report. 
U . 3 .  Ambaasador Lerner an$ Counselor for Economic and Commercial 
Affairs Andrew D. Sens were most kind and helpful in'arranglng interviews with 
Norweglan offlciats. The group mot wlth offlclals from the Norweglan Foreign 
Ministry, Ministry of Pinance. Ministry of Industry, Petroleum Directorate, 
Department of Environmental Pmtactlon, 'Statoll, State Pollution Contra1 Authority, ' 
- 
Mnyor of Stavanger, the Clean Seas Group, <nd othere. Norwegians, both In 
offlclal and unofficial capacities, were most hospitable and helpful and provided 
informatlon on a l l  aspects  of petroleum development. 
The report reprbents  the vlews and impressions of Dr. Lynch and Dr. 
Johansen on  the relevance and significance of ~ o w e g i a n  experiences to the 
development of t h e  petroleum resources on the continental shelf of Alaska. The 
development of policies to guide petroleum activities on the continental sheli  Is  a 
major concern in the Gulf of Alaska and the recently announced Beaufort Sea 
leases. The magnitude of future potentials on Alaska's continental shelf 1s . 
suggested by ita simple size: i t  Is  larger in aren than Scandinavla. 
1 
Norwegian experlencas, while occurdng in a different political, cultural, 
soclal and physical environment 'than Alaska, seem to offer some Lnslghts into 
the types of problems and opportunlt1es which Alaska may face. Some forms 
of cooperation between Alaska and Norway may prove useful to both, particularly 
in  the areas of soclo-economic lmpacts on coastal communltles, marine environmental 
proteadon measures, and the role of governmental policies on petroleum activities, 
Thie report Is  not intended to be scholarly and complete, but rather gives 
impressions made In an a l l  too bdef trip and from reviewing some slxty odd 
reports. The findings and ~onclus lons  are the sole responsibility of the authors, . 
Dr. Lynch and Dr. Johanren, whose travel waa funded by the National Science 
Foundation and the Mineral Industry Research Laboratory of the University of 
Alaska. 
The report first addresses the background of petroleum development in 
' Norway and the curtent situation, and then discusses the.lmplicatlons of 
4 
developments In North Nornray to Alaska, presents some informat~on on the 
environmental controls affectlng the Bamble petrochemlcal complex, describes 
the impressions recelved on roclo-economic impacts of petroleum development 
on Stavanger, revlefi the major conclusions reached in Norwegian studies of the 
Ekoflsk Bravo Blow-Out and offers some concluding comments. A chronology I 
of petroleum dovelopment in  Norway, references by toplcs and a bibliography 
are appended. 
The over-rldlng lmpresslon that one recelves from examlnlng the Nameglan 
experience is'that, wlth proper planning, preparation and control, petroleum, 
and natural gas  development cen provide aigniflcant opportunltles for social 
and economic growth and improvements in  the quality of Ufe.  Norwegian government 
and induatry seem to have been able to work cooperatively in most areas wlth 
major internallonat petroleum companies. 
Alaska could learn much from the Norwegian experience particularly 
regarding the need8 of local governments facing the challenges of oil exploration 
and development, the problems of surveilling and controllinq operations on the 
continental shelf, implicationsl of petro-chemical development, the potential 
conflicts bgtween fishing and petroleum development, and the integration of 
petroleum development with established social and political goals. 
Background 
Petroleum deyeloprnent became important in Norway in the 1960a with the' 
first oil leasing and the beginning of Norwegian construction of moblle drilling 
rigs. From the lute 1960s to the early 19703, Norway considered the implications 
of petroleum development and made major policy decisions. These included 
fostering a vertical domestic petroleum industry including capabilities for ex- 
plorat!on, suppart, construction of drilling platforms and other equipments, * 
development of a potro-chemical industry, support of petroleum related scientific, 
technical and policy research, and the establishmant of a state owned petroleum 
company, Statoil. IF short, Noway quickly acquired 6arked capabilities to 
canduct petroleum exploration and development and established the institutional 
P 
framework for becoming a world exporter of petro-rihemical products. 
This economic development was paralleled by the establishment of social 
and political policies designed to effect major social changes inv~lv lng  greater 
emphasis on the quallty of Ilfe, human rights, and expanded employment, social 
and economia equality, and greater partlclpatory democracy. In short. pollcles 
. + 
were designed to harness petroleum activities in their broadest sense towards the 
1 
achlevemont 01 polltically established social goals configured around the concept 
of a wolfarc state.  
The economic value of petroleum related activities and revenues has 
been greater In Noway than in Alaska, although Alaska i s  s t  present and probably 
will rrmsln 4 larger producer of petroleum than Norway, Nameglan policy haa 
been implemented by stage5 of establlshlng state control over petroleum exploratlon 
, 
and development. The primary legal Instrument has been leasing pollcy. Where 
011 leases are auctioned in Alaska, In Norway they are awarded to that company 
or group of companies whlch Is most able and wlllinq to conttlbute to the achievement 
of Norweglen economlc and soclal obJectlves. The lease system was changed in 
1972 to emphasize graatet s tate Influence. NegoUations include consideration 
of the number of wells to be drllled, degree of participation by Statoil, actlvity 
rate, tho company's financial abilitlos, safety and performance record, technical 
and reaearch capabilities, and experience in the North Sea. Each company 
salected is requlred to Incorporato in Noway and pays a small area fee whlch 
remains modest for six years and then Inctcasea greatly if exploratlon actlvlty - 
i s  not consldered satisfactory. Once In productlon however, thehtotal taxation 
in petroleum appears ta be higher than In Alaska. 
The devolopmoat of Norwegian policy corresponds wlth the discovery and 
. . 
start of productlon In the Ekofisk fiold (1970-1971) and the Heimdal field (1972-1974). 
The Statfjord flcld was dcclarod oommorcial In 1974 and should enter into productlon 
in 1970. Tho Ftlgg gaa field entered Into productlon In 1977. A new phase In 
pctroloum dovelopment may be startlng a t  present wlth the oponlng of Statoil 's 
office In Harstcld, North Norway, and tho ppsslble boginnllng of petrolcum exploration 
in  North Norway In two blacks sltuatcd ~ [ f s h o r e  from Tmmso, in areas considered 
vital for the  flshlng industry. 
flaving developed a n  lndustrlal capablllty tiad to o i l  exploration and 
devalopment on the contlnenta\ shelf ,  Norway would seem to have committed itso\f 
to  further o i l  qxploratlon. Estlmates of produotion potentials from known fields 
indicated a decline In production levels in  the la te  1980s. In short, the potentials 
known to  exlst at preaent uppeat to have a productive life of only a decade,  so that 
sustalned econornlc growth will depend in large part on moving oi l  actlvltles, 
northward into unexplored a reas ,  This move appears to be a t  i t s  inltial s tage in 
1978 and wlll see continental shelf petroleum development move into geographic 
environments somewhat akin to those of coastal  Alaska. The Norwegian decision 
to expand off-shore drilllna northward seems to be  ,occurring at the same time , 
a s  Alaska 18 deciding to lnltlate petroleum leaslng in the Reaufott Sea. Norway, 
however, l a  approaching the task with much more polltlcal, technlcal. Industrlal, 
and eoclal knowledge than Is the State  of Alaska. Alaska, on the other hand would 
seem to have a greater potential for o i l  and natural gas .  
CHRONOLOGY OF 
CONTINENTAL SHELF OIL DEVELOPMENT 
IN NORWAY 
I962 -Phillips Petroleum Company requested a manopoly 
. on oil development in the Norwegian sector of the 
Continental Shelf 
1963 4 n  May 31, Norway proclaimed its sovereignty over the 
Nowegian Continental Shelf aa TCq8Tdl exploration 
for and utilization of natural resources 
1964 -Establishment of the Continental Shelf Commision 
1965 -First petroleum leases glven 
-Establishment of the State Oil Council 
-First petroleum development permits i ~ s u e d  
-First contraat to Norwegian shipyard to build a mobile 
oil platform 
1966 ;First oil and gas drilling in the ~ o r t h  Sea 
-Drilling in Norwegian Continenral Shelf began in 1966; 
102 holes Were drilled by 1973 
1969-70 -Geophysical prospecting in North Norway 
1968 -Second period of petroleum leases 
' 1969 -First economically significant oil and gas discoveries 
1970 -Discovery of Ekofisk Field 
1971 -Test production began in the Ekoflsk Fleld 
-011 production started a t  Ekofisk Field 
1972 -Staroil founded 
-North Noway Oil Council established 
' -Heimdal Field discovered; declared commercial lo 1974 
1973 -Third round of leases 
1973-74 -International oil crisis 
-Period of steepest growth in petroleum activity 
1974 -Publication of Parlimentary Report No. 2 5  establishing 
Norwegian government guidelines for petroleum 
development in Noway. Assumed production of 35 millio? 
tons of oil and 25 million tons of gas equivalents by 1977 
. -011 production reached 28 million barrels (about 3.7 million tons) 
-Statfjord Field declared commercial 
i975 -Monthly oil productions from Ekoffsk Jumped from about 
250,000tonsto 1,115,000tons 
1976 -Monthly oil production from Ekofiak increased to 1,400,000 tons 
1976-77 -Use of side looking sonar and underwater tetevision showed 
extensive debris on ocean bottorne left by oil exploration 
companles including holes drilled by ESSO 
1977 -26 billion kroner ($5.2 billion) balance of payment deficit . 
-6 bllllon kroner ($1.2 billion) tax income from petroleum activity 
in 1978 
-Norway's total imports in 1977 exceeded exports by 20 billion 
kroner ($4 billion). In 1977, petroleum production was 
16 million tons of oil and gas equivalents (320,000 barrels per day) 
=Bravo Blow-Out 
-Production from Frigg gas fisld 
-Bamble petro-chemical complex in operation 
-Completion of Statfjord "A", thg world's largest off-shore 
+ 
production platform, built in Stavanger 
1076-78 a Rcport No. 90 lo The Storling 
Tho dovclopmont nnd lnndlng OK pctrolsum fmm Tho Otatijord Flold , 
and 8 g~ trunk-line 
Fig. i. Ooograpliicaf location o/ tho Frigg, Ilcimdol Q I I ~  Stntljord ficlda. 
Norwegian North Sea Petroleum ~evelopment , 
Current Status 
Petroleum development on the continental shelf off Norway has been 
restricted to the area south of the stxty second parallel. Slgnlficant drilling north 
of that latitude has  not yet been permitted by the Norwegian government for 
major policy rearons. Among these has been a desire on the part of the 
Norwegian government to maintain oi l  and gas  production at a \eve\ compatible 
with the economic needs of the Norwegian economy in order to provide for 
sustained growth, improvements in  the quality of life, and to avoid major social 
and economic dislocations, particularly i n  promoting migrations from smaller 
settlements to major urban areas. In addition, there i s  fear of a genuine conflict 
between th; rich fisheries along the coast  of North Norway and petroleum 
development. The conflict i~ viewed as one of potential oil pollution, injury 
to the trawler fleet from petroleum activities, and possible competition for 
labor . 
Fouling of fishing gear is a real problem because of the amount of material 
whlch o i l  copnpanles have thrown into the sea around ddlling platforms. The 
yaterials  have seriously damaged trawlers' gear. The evidence for the failure 
of o i l  companies to follow regulations regarding discarding materials into the 
sea consists  of television photographs, surveillance conducted by side looking 
sonar and actual m9tedals retrieved from the sea  bottom. According to one source, 
as much a s  one quarter of the North Sea may be covered with such debris a t  
the present time, The photographic evidence of fouling in  Norwegian waters 
i s  tmptesslva 
The forecasts forpetroleum development upon which Norwegian policy 
. . has been based o r l g l ~ l l y  envisaged-a total production of a maximum of 90 
I 
mlllion tons of 011 and the equivalent in  g a s  by 1980 whlch 1s equal to 
approximately 1.8 mllUon h r r e l r  per day. The Tranr Alaska pipeline, by 
. comparison, i e  carrying 1.2 mllllon barrels per day a t  present. The Norweplan 
government felt  that productlon a t  this rate was mote than sufficlant and that 
greater levels of production mlght encourage, among other things, too rapld 
s rate o l  lnflat~on In a countty with a population expeated to reaoh 4,000,000 
by 1980. 
With the publication of 8 major petroleum policy in 1974, Norway had 
embarked upon a perlod of devebplng 011 related industries which brought 
employment to over 20,000 Norweglans and saw extenslve Investment In 
petroleum related actlvltles Including shipyards and the Bamble gas  refinery 
deslgned to produce polyethelenes and vlnylchlorlde for the European plastics 
Industry. Tho Bamhle reflnery Is  based on  the use of natural gas Ilguida obtained 
from a plant a t  Teaslde, Scotland. The Teaslde plant ha8 encountered significant 
. dlfficultles in construction and 1s behlnd schadule. t h e  year 1977 raw Norwegian 
investment reach an all-tlme hlgh wlth the economy operating a t  full employmant 
In splte o i  a marked decline In traditional exports and e rapid growth In domestic 
~ o s t s  of productlon, particularly a slgnlflcant Increase in labor costs .  
011 and gas production in 1977, originally forecast a t  a level of 35 million 
tona of oil and 25 rnllllon tons of gas  (Ln 011 equlvalents), was only 16 mllllon 
tons of oiI and gae (in 011 equlvalents). The resultant shortfall in 011 revenues 
and taxes, reduction In antlclpated exports a* hlgh Investments lead to a 
balance of paymonts deficlt for 1977 01 about 26 bllllon kroner (about $5.2 bllllon) 
and a total national forelgn debt of about 80 bllllon kroner (ahput $16 billion), 
The Bravo blow-out of Aprll 1977 and other factor6 caused a delay In ol l  p+toduction. 
These flnanclal problems lead lo' t h e  February, 1978 devaluation of the Norweglan 
crown which waq under discussion during the trlp to Norway. Fiscal and 
1876-70 Bsport No. 81 to the Nanveglaa Btorting 
- .  
I North Norway teasing Areas 
12 
eoenomlc conslderatlona would seem to be compclllng the Qovdmment of Norway 
to open the contlnental rhslf north of the slxty second parallsl to 011 learing 
durlng 1078-1974 In order to Inareaso the economlofl benefits d s t l v d  from 
Norwegian Involvement in oll 'explontion actlvitles, howevor the p l l u t l m  . 
potentlal a s  aeen In tho Bravo blow-out may cause a further delay. 
North Sea petroleum developments durlng the past decade can be  LnstrUCtlve 
In ostimutlng potsntlal Impacts of petroleum development on the continental 
shelf of Alaska. However, the near term development of pevoleum In North 
Norway wljl more closely approxlmateAlaskan condltlons and should therefore 
be closely followed. 
North Nomeolan 011 DeveloomenF 
On. of the malor dlfflcultles I e c l n ~  petroleum exploratron and development 
In North Norway Is  that the most promlslng areas for petroleum Ilea in some of 
the most slgnlflcant flshlng grounds found in the Nomteglan Sea, an 
18' XI' U' 
I \ 
shown below. 
Source: 
The Mlnistrv 01 In$iuiE 
and Crafts. PetrQldunl 
  lo re ti on North 0 4  & Report No .  9 1 
to the NQrwsslan 
Stortfng, page 56. 
. Flgure 12: ~ l s h i &  grounds a t  or nepr Ieaainp Area 1 
Another is the general perception that if commercially significant dep'bsite of 
petroleum are found, development will follow almost autornatioally and a t  a pace 
,which wlll Fause social end ~ c o n o m i c  impacts beyond the aapabilitles of local 
$ 7  i" 
govecnmenta to handle. The lacation and impact8 of ahore installations for 
both exploration and development a re  major issues.  One significant concern 
under Norwegian conditions i s  the possibllity that malor share installations 
1 .. 
+ -  I and expanded petroleum related employment will lead to a concentratton of 
: p 
population in large communities. Official Norwegian policy i s  tb maintain 
the economic pnd social viability of small uettlementu, a policy objective 
which Is pmbably shared in many parts of coastal Alaska. In the longview, the 
continental shelf off North Noway probably has a greater petmleum potential 
than the area south of 62 '~ .  Development could lead to social and economic 
changes of such magnitude, as to constitute a malor turning polnt in the history 
: of North Norway. 
North Noway consir ts  of Nordland, Troms and Plnnmatk, a region with 
a n  area of about 112,000 square kitometers and a population of approximately 
4_50,000 people, stretching along the coast  of the Norwegian Sea from a little 
south of the Arctic Circle to 72 degrees north latitude. In terms of physical ' 
geography, thin region has similarltles in climate to much of Southeastern 
and Southcentral Alaska, and like western Alaska i t  I s  a coastal area heavily 
dependent upon the products of the sea tor Its livelihood. The region has shown 
a marked tendency for people to mlgrste to the larger settlements in the last 
two decades and has functioned a s  a frontier area basing i t s  economy principally 
on the primary industries (mining, forestry, farmlng and fisheries) and wijh a 
lower level of services and communications than elsewhere In Norway. Nordland 
has been the one part of Norway to show a marked decline In employment 
* '1 
opportunltiqs during recent years. 
Petroleum exploration and development i s  viewed a s  a posstble solution 
to the problems of unemployment and depopulation of smaller communltles. The 
desire seems to be for a type of petroleum activity which will maximize economic 
activities in North Norway by 1. a. supporting local 1ndustrie.s. One goal 
seems to be to encourage decentralization of manufacturing and supply activities 
Into smaller communlties, 
North Norway also has 30,000 Lapps (Samer) who have been to a degree 
culturally discriminated against in the past. ~ a s e d ' o n  the llterature reviewed, 
the Lapp peaple seem not to have taken any position regarding petroleum 
development as a distinct cultural group. 
The regional pldn for North Norway of 1972 (Landelsplannen, p. 22 1-222) 
favors of oil exploration and development, but on a different basls than that 
followed in stavanger-Rogaland. Fartlcularly, the plan favors spreading 
011 related activities into smaller communities maklng maximum utillzatlon 
of labor and other local available skills and resources in Norkh Norway. The 
plan foresaw a need for significant financial support from the aentral government 
for building communal tnfra-structure and services in anticipation of petroleum 
development. 
The regional plan advocated the Creation of the North Norway Oil Council 
which was established In August, 1972, for the pur,pose of maklng policy 
recommendations regarding petroleum development. The Councll's.rot8 was to be 
an advisory body for local and central governmental authorities and for public 
and private oil interest3 in North Norway (Myrland, p. 23) .  The Council 
consists of 9 political members aleaced by local government bodles and four. 
consultative members representing the Norwegian Fisheries Associatioa 
15 
the Norwegian Trade Union Organiaatlon, the Norwegian Association of 
Employere, and the Norwegian Induetrial Society. In addition, major gobernment 
departments were given observer s tatus (Myrlsnd, P. 30-31). 
The North Notway 011 Council has attempted to develop guidelines for 
petroleum development w l i c i e s  which can be  supported by local governments 
. . 
8, and be utilized as a basis for broad public discussion. In this fashion, the 
1 
Council also functions a s  an information service on petroleum policy problems that 
't ' may affect North Norway. 
One disputed conclusion that the Council has reached, based on data from 
South Norway and Great Britain, i s  that labor i s  not transferred from the fisheries, 
farming. and forestry sectors to petroleum activities, s o  that fears of petroleum 
' 
development destroying basic industries may be unfounded (Cf. Vallestad, p, 17; 
Reiersen. pp. 13, 16). It has recommended that in general the state should control 
end direct petroleum development by selecting companies and controlling leasing, 
that enviranmenlhl controls should be established, and that there should be 
the fewest possible negative social effects of petroleum development. The Council 
recommends that local governments do their own socio-economlc impact analysis 
end planning and that they .be given sufficient time and resources to do so  
(Nord-Norsk Oljaraad, 23 May 1977). The last  point appears to be particularly 
Important a s  experience suggests that local governments usually have nelther 
the time nor the capabilities necessary to plan adequately for the impact of 
petroleum development. This same point i s  stressed by John Sewel regarding 
communities in Scotland. 
The literature revlewed on North Norway end the impressions r ~ c e i v e d  
during the trip suggest'that the government laast  able to plan for and cope with 
impacts of off-shore petroleum development i s  a t  the local level. The North 
- * 
~ o k e g i a n  Oil Council seems to fulfill a needed role a s  an advisory body to 
both local and notional governments, and i t s  recommendatlon,that local governments' 
planning and resoarch capabilltles be conslderably strengthened In advance of 
petroleum exploration may be very appropriate for coastal Alaskan communities 
as well . 
Potra-Chemlcal Industries (Bambld 
Norway has a well-rounded economy with a significant manufacturing 
sector and industrial labor force, unlike Alaska whlch I s  heavlly based on pdmary 
and tertiary economic activities and has only limited secondary industrial 
development. Of the many reasons behlnd this dlffarence, one has been the strong 
emphasls In Norway on energy production and most parttcularly the large-scale 
development of hydraetectric power and policies designed to support mining, 
mineral and chemical industries, processing of agricultural, forestry and fishing 
products, and a rshlp building industry tied to one of the world's iargest merchant 
marines. Norway has attempted in many rectors of i t s  economy to utilize and 
develop advanced technology. Approximately one half of Norway's total energy 
needs comes from hydroelectric power, while in addition Norway has three 
refineries producing both for the domestic and a significant foreign market. 
Bared on this background of knowledge and experlence, the Norwegian government 
has supported a signlficsnt expansion of the petro-chemical industry with a view 
towards developing a major export capability. 
The resulting prolect involves an investment of approximately one billion 
dollars by Norsk Hydro, Saga and Statoll in a petrochemical complex a t  Bumble 
based on natural gas liquids and able to produce 300,000 tons of vinyl chiodde, 
100,000 tons of high density polyethylene, 40,000 tons of low density po!yethytene 
and 50,000 tons of polypropylene per year. Construction of the Bamble plant, 
located at  Rafnes near Porsgrunn, commenced In 1974,Pollutlon in the Porssrunn-Skien 
area must be leas when the Bamble plant i s  operational than it was before. 
In short, the additional pollution from Bamble can be offset by decreasing pollution 
from othw a a r c e a .  A detailed study of environmental conditions prior to the 
commencement of construction was undertakkn. 
. . 
7 The Porspnrnn-Skien region I s  physically somewhat like Prince William 
1 
Sound and Cook Inlet, and the general characteristics of the Bamble plant seem 
% similar to same of the proposals for a petrochemical complex in  Alaska. The 
results of the Bamble project would be worth asseesing before a similar project 
i r  undertaken In Alaska both from a n  economic and an environmental viewpoint. 
The concept of astablishing overall reglonal norms fur acceptable pollution levels 
and then allowlng an increase in  pollution from one activity to be offset by a 
decrease from othw actlvltlea may be worth conslderatlon a t  least in the Fairbanks 
area, wlth i t s  chronic winter Ice fog problem. 
Comments on the IrnDact of P e t r w  Develoument on ~ t a v a n k  
To someone accustomed to the newness of Alaska's towns, i t  always comes 
a s  a bit of a auprlse to vlsit e clty whose ofigins go back to the twelfth century. 
ttavanger, a beautiful city in southwest Norway, i s  such a settlement, one that 
enjoyed significant growth in the nineteenth century a s  a center for the fishing 
industry and in  particularly canning sardines, In the post World War II prriod, 
the city of Stavanger has seen i t s  population Increase Imm about 50,000 to 
approximately 87,000. I t  became the center for oil development on the Norwegian 
continental shelf and enjoyed a population growth of 10,000 In the last  decade. 
The general Stavanget-Rogaland region today has a population of about 176,000. 
In recent years populattongrmth has been about 0.8% In the city and 1.4% annually 
in the surrounding region. Oil activJtles employ about 7,600 of the total Stavanger 
\ * labor force of 37,000. Approxlrnately 1.7 to 2.0 jobs are created to support 
asch 011 rolatcd job when new development i s  Involved. In the paet;one support 
job was created for each new oil  related lob. There a re  approxlmately 1,300 
forelqners in oi l  related positions in Btavanqer. Wlth dependents, the number 
of foreigners 1s approxlmately 5,200 of whom about 44% are belleved to be Americans. 
We encountered some disagreements a s  to the magnitude of the social 
problems which have occurred in Stevanger due to the impact of petroleum 
aatlvities. One afflclal felt that the problems of crlme and drugs were less  
In Stavanger than in other Norwegian ci t les  a d  that in general the problems 
of cultural inter-action between the foreigners and Norweglans had been handlad 
rather well. Others argued that the  impact of drugs, alcohol and hlgh petroleum 
wages hadcreated serious problems of social change. American$ in,Stavanger 
seemed to be the object of some criticism. 
One very signlflcent difference between Norway and the United Statas i s  that 
Norwegian local governments have scrong administrative controls over housing, 
settlement patterns and land ownership. Stavanger has deliberately spread 
foreign famllies throughout the city in order to avoid the creation of forelgn concen- 
gations and consequent problems. Foreigners are not a l l o w d  to purchase 
houslng without speclal permission and forelgn companies are not permitted to 
purchase land, In addition, the government df Norway has various l e ~ a l  controls 
over the movemont of foreigners and their actlvltles which could not be applied 
in the State of Alaska against people from the other StBte8. As a general impression, 
i t  seems that the government of Stavanger has been able to take more stringent 
measures in con troll in^ problems of social behavlor that would be acceptable 
In Alaska due to the difference5 in political and cultural systems. Many pf t h e ,  
problems and complaints encountered could be ascribed to social and economic 
trends, general trends In aoqte of llvlng and inflation, 'ayl  other factors conseguent 
upon growth that a re  in  many ways independent of the parllcular causative 
force. 
Stavanger, with a population of 87,000,has a police force of 197 uniformed 
personnel. The  airb banks North Stat Borough, with a total population of almost 
70,000 i s  rervad by approximately 95 city police and State Troopers, 
pontine 1tal h i l l  n 
Alaska's continental shelf has an area somewhat larger than that of the 
state itself end comprises the largest continental shelf adlacent to any state 
in  the Union, The Norwegian continental shelf Is approximately three times the 
s i z e  of the land'area of Norway. Both Norway and Alaska face major tasks in 
providing suwelllance over activities on their continental shelves. The difference, 
of course, i s  that the Jurisdiction of the State of Alaska i s  limited and the primary 
responsiblllty for surveillance i s  vested in  the Federal Government. The effects 
of pollution however, will damage Alaska's interests. 
Noway i s  Jus t  beginning to establish a coast  guard and i t s  military 
capabilities are most modest. Surveillance of fisheries activities has been con- 
ducted by and large wlth the use of chartered vessels .  Proposals to establish 
a coast  guard with wide-ranging responslbilitles over fisheries, gotroleurn 
activities, pollution, sea  bed fouling, etc. ,  envisage creating an interim capablilty 
with the use of chartered civilian vessels  'and crews commanded by a naval 
officer and with n a h l  gun crews (Parlimentary Report No. 81, pp. 4 ,  9).  Polica 
responsibilities are to be divided among coastal police hoadquarters (as appears 
to be the c a s e  i n  Stavanger) with a strong recommandrtlon that the p@FSOn In charge 
of an oi l  installation Qh the continental shelf be accorded the ,same powers a s  a 
ship's master including the "ure of.force if  necessary to secure obedience" 
(Report 811 p. 7). In addition there i s  also a proposal to create a special marine 
commando scctlon to provlde asslstanco In combatting major terrorist acttvltios 
on the continental shelf. There may be some merlt from Alaska's viewpoint 
In considering the Norweglan propoaal to use  charter vessels  from the existing 
fishing fleet for surveillance of continental shelf operations and 4\80 for u s e  
in pollution clean-up activities, In additlon, the impact of continental shelf 
petroleum development on local police and the Alaska State court system ahould 
be carefully taken Into account. 
The need for improved surveillance over petroleum activities has become 
obvlous In Norway due to the clear evldence of sea bed foullng and the Bravo 
Blow-Out of April, 1977. The Bravo Blow-Out ocouaed because of a failure 
in the inqtallation of blowvut preventers during a major overhaul operation. 
The Norwegian lnvestigatlon comrnlttee which analyzed the blow-out found that 
the underlylng cause of the accident was inadequate organlzatlonal and adminis- 
tratlve systems and highllghted the fact that the personnel Involved, in splte of 
long experience. lacked the theoretical education required for such positions under 
Norweglan regulatlons for moblle platforms (gravora~wrten , p. 81. The commlttee 
also found that the reports, diagrams and other forms of documentauon regarding 
the drilling operation were Inadequate &&yorarrtxrrten,p. 37-38). The lack of 
documentation "lead to a malor mistake Ln the planning and later approval of the 
workover procedure" (&yprannorten,p. 90). 
The blow-out occurred on the Ekotlsk 8, Bravo, platform operated by 
Phillips Petroleum Company Norway on April 22,  1977, Phillips had not yet develope'd 
' 
emergency plans for such a contigoncy a s  requlred under the Norweglan regulatlona 
of July 9,  1916. In addltlon, no natlonal emergency plan existed elther, and the 
Norweglan actlon group established t o  coordinate emergency measures foulid 
i tself  lacking any real knowledge of how to handle an uncontrolled blow-out, The 
blow-out was gapped by Phlllips with the assistance of Red Adair on April 30,1978, 
The Nomreglan action group, while critical of Phillips on some polnts. found 
no grounds for abjectlng to the manner in which the oapping operation was 
conducted IAkslan.ledelsene p. 7, 8, 11). 
, 
Altogether ebout 25 vessels  and 200 personnel were involved in the 011 
t 
f clean-up opetarion a't sea  which recovered 870 tons of oil. The Nonveglan 
. . action group refused to allow the use  of chemical oil dispursants except in the area 
f near the platform. The limited use  of dispursants did not lead to any environmental 
damage. The clean-up operation was improvlaed as there was a shortage of 
personnel with the experience and equipment necesaafy (Aks. led. rap: p. 12).  
Total environmental damage was slight due largely to favourable weather and sea 
conditions. The ~ b r w e ~ i a n  ctlon group found that "all in a l l  i t  could be sald that 
one could dot have been more fortunate from an environmental protection viewpoint." 
(Akrr. led. rap: g.  13) Among the major factors involved here was the location of 
the blow-out about 175 miles from the nearest coastline and the absence of birds, 
fish or other life in  the polluted area (AksJ. led. rap; p. 12-14). The significance 
01 favourable weather arid sea conditions on the evaporation of hydrouarbons has 
been highlighted in a n  Exxon study which further estimates that petroleum production 
operations contribute only flve percent of the total hydrocarbons present In the 
North Soa. 
Interviews with indlvlduals lnvolved In the Bravo Blow-Out emergency. 
films shown and the reports evallsble suggest that the tempo of preparations 
to handle such an event was unsatisfactory. The planning and preparations whlch 
commenced in 1976 warn not sufficiently developed to meet the actual SltyUOn 
which occurred in April of 1977. In addltion, the actual pollution and damage that 
. . 
t might have resulted could have been significantly worse under different weather 
-\ . 
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and sea state conditions or under the circumstance that the platform was located 
closer to shore and in a major fisheries region. The lesson for Alaska Is that 
both plans and capabilltles to prevent si(, . ~ l c a q t  spitla and to minimize the 
probable damage should he developed before and not after the emergency. 
The Norwegian State Pollution Control Authorities have established 
requirements for anti-p~llution preparednese and have approved the creation 
of a separate organization financed by the petroleum companies operating In the 
North Sea to handle pollution problems, The government has established the 
design and operatlonal objectives, but the petroleum companies themselves 
have been given the clean-up responslbillty. The organleation, visited in Slsvanger, 
i s  named the North Sea Operators Committee - Norway: Clean Seas Group and IS 
funded by Phillips (SZ%),Nordsk Hydmand Esso (7% each),Staroil (6.4%). Mobll 
and Conoco (5% each), Amoco and Elf (4% each), BP (3%), Shell and Saga (2% each), 
and Union Oil and Gulf (less than 1% each). This arrangement 1s viewed a s  more 
satisfactory than requiring each individual company to maintain i t s  own emergency ' 
preparedness facllltles white keeping the responslblllty for clean-up operations 
v-ested in the petroleum companlcs rather than in a government agency. 
The government's oblectives ere that the Clean Seas Group must have a 
capability to clean up 8,000 tons of oi l  per day under an ocean current speed of 1.5 
knots. South of 6 2 ' ~  the emergency equipment must be activated within 48 hours, 
while north af 62' the activation period regulred is 24 hours. Wave height con- 
ditions specified ara 2.5 meters south of 62' and 3.0 metera north of 62'. 
The Clean Seas Group has at i t s  disposal s lx dadicered supply boats, 
3,000 meters of booms a n d  specially developed skimmers designed speclf!cally 
for North Sea sea state conditions. .The Framo end Thune Eureka skimmers cost  
5100,000 to 150,000 apiece, operate by gravity separatlon of surface oil from 
ea te r ,  and in the films viewed showed a marked capability to operate under 
difficult pea states,  
The six dedicated vessels  are normally used to supply oil operations but 
have a firrt priority for emergency use. The Clean Seas Group felt that this was 
1 B better approach than building and maintaining special purpose vessels .  Statoll 
b 
was said to be considering using fishing vessels  to hold booms in place for operations 
.+, - 
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in  North Norway. Evidently trawlers and purse selpers with bow thrustera are 
suitable under the antlclpated sea state conditions. 
The eoncept of requiting the petroleum ~ 0 m p a n i e l  to develop their own 
orgenizatlon and cooperative plans for emergencier unddr the approval of responfilble 
uovernmeniagencies may have applicability on the Alaskan continental shelf. The 
approach placer responsibility on  the petroleum companies with the advantage that 
a special purpoee organization i s  created whlch should be able to cooperate well 
with i t s  owner companies. Additionally, the concept of using existing fishing 
and supply vessels  with a dedication to emergency use might be applicable In Alaska. 
The people of coasts1 Alaska are very mbch sea  oriented, have extensive 
e_xperience in flshing and other maritime endeavors, and good reason to be some- . 
what fearful of environmental pollution and possible harmful effects of petroleum 
development on fisheries. Involving them in a n  organization capable of reacting 
effactiveiy to pollution problems might be quite advantapeous to the State and to 
tho petroleum eompanlos. Norwegian experience here seems applicable to Alaska. 
,Same Concludins Cornmentg 
The travel in  Norway and the reports consulted concern basically govern- 
mental palicies and coflcems. One of the central themes, perhapa best  i!lustrated 
by the Bravo Blow-Out, i s  that continental shelf activities require administrative 
f organizations that can react a t  a pace compatible with that of the petroleum 
development Itself. Government organizations, particularly a t  the local level. 
seem inadequately supported and structured both to anticipate avonts and to react 
witbln the necessary time frame. 
The planning process, which seems much farther advanced in Norway than 
in  Alaska, has some basic Weaknesses, one of which i s  tha inablllty to develop 
accurate economic forecasts. The rate of petroleum activities, the boom-bust 
element, changing world economic conditions, and other factors create an uncertainty 
factor whlch in  some respects appears unmanageable. Where Norwegian planning 
appears to have been most successiuL I s  in establishing general policy goals both 
for popular discussion and a s  guidelines for action by administrative organizations. 
One element in the impact of petroleum developments stands out clearly: 
the impact i s  greatest a t  the community level. where the resources (both in admlnis- 
tratlon and finances) ere least adequate. Xn thls regard, the smaller communltlee 
of coastal Alaska would appear to be weaker than those of North Norway. Following 
a strategy of ettemptlng to isolate local'communitles from shore based petroleum 
activitise may make sensible planning imposiible and in the long term could 
prove imposslble to implement (Mackay: p. 73). A policy of contolled integration 
may prove better particularly when the shore base i s  in a large community like 
that of Stavanger, but would more likely be imposslble in smaller communities. 
Another alternative Is to ostabllsh a "deliberate pollcy.. . to use oil related 
developments a s  part of  a process alned a t  achieving major economic and social 
change" (Sewel, p. 90). This appears to be the general policy of the Norwegian 
government a t  tho national level. As far a8 North Noway i s  qoncerned, however, 
there appears to be deGeloplng a policy o r  strategy which attempts contro)led 
integration a t  the regional level with some elements of mojw economic and social 
change. The latter seem to seek greeter economic stability while preserving the 
' 
Bxiatine settlement pattern and improving the quality of urban serviaes. Should 
major petroleum developmehts occur on the North Norwegian continental shelf, 
however, 6UCh a strategy may prove untenable. The uncertainty factor regarding 
the probable course of developments contributes to a certain uneasiness about the 
general policy direction regarding horth Norway. This i s  suggested in some 
1 
. studies from the Social Iaience Institute of Tromsd Unlversity and pertlcularly. 
< .  by the opposition of fisheries organizations to any tes t  drilling. 
*i- 
Norway now enjoys some genuine advantages in considering petroleum related 
impacts. These include a n  integrated society, a developed infca-struature, an 
industrial and research base capable of pprticipatlon in oil related problems, clear 
sovereignty'ovar the national territory and the opportunities to review the experiences 
of the British sector of the North Saa. By comparison, the State of Alsskr which 
lacks sovereignty over most of the area of Alaska, is pplitlcally, technically 
and economically much weaker. Yet, i t  i s  the State which will face moat of the 
burdens of petroleum development on the Alaskan continental shelf ,  a factor which 
should weigh heavily in the decision-making process concerning petroleum 
development. 
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in Fairbanks. The group visited only Stavanger and not the surrounding Rogalsnd 
region. 
Continental Shelf Sutueitlinnce. tho Bravo Blow-Out ant P~llut lbn Control 
The overall surveillance problem i s  d i s c u s s d  1;: Forsvarsdepartmentet, 
0 SynQt med Flskeri oa ~etroleumsvirksomheten , Universitotsforlagot, 1975; 
Royal Ministry of Dofgnco, -LS and Petroleum Activities: 
. - 
The establishment of  a coastnuard service,  Repart to the Nonvoglan Storting No. 81 
Data on the Bravo Qlow-Out taken from: pravora~oorten Ukotrtrollett 
ytblaaslnq pea Bravo 2 2 ,  Awril 1977, Unlversitctsforlaget, October, 1977. 
T h e  amount of pollutants released i s  estimated t o  have been about 2,800 tons 
of oil and 1.5 million cubic meters of gas per day. About 40 percar.! of the oi l  
iimediarely evaporated because of i t s  hlgh temperature of 75 '~ .  0 1  the total 
of about 12,700 tons which covered the $ea, about half evaporated within 
twelve hours, after which evaporation rates decreased (p. 10). Clean-up 
operations removed about 870 tons of pure oi l  (p.. 12). 
On the general problem of North Sea oi l  pollution, see: C .B, Koons, R . B .  
Whaeler, Exxon Production Research Company, Basin Exploration Dlvlsion. 
Invutn. Fate ,grid X ; f f e ~ & & & & p l e u m  in Offshore Norwegian Waters, Sept., 1977, 
The study estimates that the total petroleum input into the North Sea and northeastern 
Atlantic i s  about 400,000 metric tons per year and that the standing crop of 
dispersed hydrocarbons In the North Sea alone i s  1.6 million metric tons. 95% of 
al l  hydrocarbon inputs i s  estimated to come from activities not associated wlth 
petroleum exploration and production. The report further argues, clting a 1973 
U_. S. National Academy of Science study, that oil spills do not have a harmful 
elfoct on flsh. 
Informatlon on the North Sea Operators Committee-Norway Clean Seas 
Group was obtalned in a brieflng given in Stavanger. The data In the report 
wore taken from tho brieflng alds. 
$orno Concludins Comments 
Concepts taken from John Sewel, "Northern Scotland and North Sea Oir', 
pp. 90-104; Goorgo A .  Mackay "The.Loca1 Economic and Employment Impact of 
Landfall Tcrminol and Platform Construction in Scotland", pp. 69-89, and other 
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